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Abstract
Background: In this article we aim to assess the ethical desirability of self-test diagnostic kits for influenza, focusing
in particular on the potential benefits and challenges posed by a new, mobile phone-based tool currently being
developed by i-sense, an interdisciplinary research collaboration based (primarily) at University College London
and funded by the Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council.
Methods: Our study adopts an empirical ethics approach, supplementing an initial review into the ethical
considerations posed by such technologies with qualitative data from three focus groups.
Results: Overall, we map a range of possible considerations both for and against the use of such technologies,
synthesizing evidence from a range of secondary literature, as well as identifying several new considerations
previously overlooked.
Conclusions: We argue that no single consideration marks these technologies as either entirely permissible or
impermissible but rather tools which have the potential to incur certain costs and benefits, and that context is
important in determining these. In the latter stages of the article, we explain how developers of such technologies
might seek to mitigate such costs and reflect on the possible limitations of the empirical ethics method brought
out during the study.
Trial registration: Not applicable.
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Background
The past few decades have witnessed a series of signifi-
cant advances in health diagnostic technologies, allowing
for testing to be carried out rapidly at the point of care
and by patients themselves (self-testing). Point-of-care
tests now exist for many diseases and medical special-
ties, including: cholesterol [1]; glucose [2]; faecal occult
blood and liver function tests [3]; HIV antigen and HIV
antibody [4]; chlamydia [5]; cryptococcus [6]; malaria
[7]; hepatitis C [8]; tuberculosis [9, 10]; blood alcohol
level and drugs abuse. Although not available for as
many health conditions as point-of-care diagnostics,
there are also a growing number self-testing kits, includ-
ing those for glucose, cholesterol, blood pressure, HIV-
infection, fertility and pregnancy [11].
The potential benefits of such advances are evident.
Point-of-care tests allow clinicians to receive test results
much faster than traditional laboratory-based methods,
improving patient care and clinical outcomes [12].
Laboratory-independence also means such tests can
often be conducted in diverse settings, most notably
those with weak health service or laboratory infrastruc-
ture [13]. Self-tests might also enable individuals to
manage their health proactively, allowing individuals to
make lifestyle changes or seek medical interventions
sooner that could improve prognosis and reduce harm
or suffering, as well as decrease infectious disease trans-
mission [14].
Yet such technologies also raise ethical concerns. As
with any diagnostic, kits may generate false positives or
false negatives – potentially leading users to make deci-
sions based on inaccurate information [15, 16]. With
self-tests, risks are compounded by the increased likeli-
hood of individuals failing to conduct the test properly,
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misunderstanding test results or misunderstanding the
reported accuracy of those results [17, 18]. When tests
are conducted at home, individuals are also less likely
to have sufficient support structures in place, either
pre- or post-diagnosis [14, 19, 20].
In this article we consider the ethical challenges posed
a new set of diagnostics: namely, self-test diagnostic kits
for influenza. We centre our analysis on one mobile
phone-based diagnostic tool in particular, namely a new
kit being developed by i-sense, an interdisciplinary
research collaboration based (primarily) at University
College London and funded by the Engineering and
Physical Sciences Research Council [21]. The tool being
developed by i-sense amounts to a ‘third generation
point of care diagnostic test’, being a mobile-phone based
technology that is designed to enable simultaneous de-
tection of multiple targets (in this case differing strains
of influenza) using more accurate biomarkers than older,
second generation tests [22]. The technology works by
effectively converting the phone’s camera into a spec-
trometer. A mechanism is fitted over the phone so that
light reflected off commercial influenza tests may be col-
lected through the phone’s camera. An app on the phone
then analyses data from the camera to establish the diag-
nosis. To perform the test, the user starts by running a
cotton bud around their mouth to gather a good amount
of saliva. They then apply that swab to a chemical strip,
before inserting the chemical strip into the mechanism
attached to the phone, and then using the app on the
phone to run the required analysis – after which the app
informs the user of the result (e.g. ‘Influenza detected’).
The tool analysed in this study was a prototype. At this
point, in a full version of the tool, users would be asked
whether they would be willing to share the results of their
test (without any identifying information) with i-sense
researchers and local health providers (for example, the
National Health Service). Users could then additionally be
asked whether they would also be willing to share geo-
location data (e.g. post-code) and perhaps certain other
pieces of relevant information (age, sex of the user etc.).
Taken together with other data sets, this would allow
researchers to map the spread of a disease across a popu-
lation in real time, thus aiding infectious disease planning.
Similar tests are also being developed by i-sense for
bacterial infections and HIV/AIDS [23].1
As well as generating many of the same ethical con-
siderations that apply to diagnostic tools in general, the
self-test kits being developed by i-sense present their
own specific set of issues. On the one hand, as a relatively
routine and often asymptomatic infection, individuals may
be more open to testing for influenza at home, away from
professional support. On the other hand, however, influ-
enza can sometimes also be both highly virulent and
extremely dangerous, raising questions about how the
development of such tools might change our obligations
to one another during a pandemic: would self-testing
become morally obligatory? The technology’s potential to
collect real-time health data also raises important ques-
tions around privacy: even where user’s test results are
anonymized, when combined with geo-location and other
data there is a risk of re-identification following a data
breach, especially in areas of low population density. The
extent to which researchers’ use of the data can be ad-
equately covered by a process of informed consent is also
open to question. Similar to donations to a biobank, it
might be information about how the data will be used in
the future is not available at the time of donation and
hence cannot be disclosed. If so, the research participant
would not know the relevant facts of the specific research
and would not know to what they are consenting.
To help map this complex and intricate ethical land-
scape, we adopt an empirical ethics approach [24], com-
bining normative analysis with qualitative research drawn
from three focus groups. In this, we bring together two re-
lated strands of research: i), a growing bioethical literature
on the ethics of diagnostic technologies, and self-testing in
particular [14, 17, 25, 26]; and ii), a sociological literature
that has sought to understand individuals’ motivation for
and experience of self-testing [18, 27, 28].
The structure of the article is as follows. In section
two, we further detail our study’s method. In section
three we present findings from an initial review of the
ethical issues around self-testing, along with findings
from three focus groups convened to discuss the ethical
desirability of the technologies, their various benefits
and drawbacks. In section four we discuss how these
findings confirm some of our existing intuitions around
the ethics of such technologies, raise new issues both in
their favour and against them, and highlight the context-
specificity and disease-specificity of our thinking relating
to self-testing. Here we also consider how developers
might anticipate and attempt to mitigate possible ethical
concerns in the way they design such technologies and
set out some of the limitations of the study. We conclude
in section five.
Methods
This paper follows an empirical ethics approach to the
ethical issues raised by self-test diagnostics. Specifically,
we adopt what Molewijk et al. refer to as a ‘theorist’
approach to empirical ethics, wherein data drawn from
the research encounter is used primarily as a means to
correct or supplement insights derived from normative
theorising [29].
Two features characterise our reading of this approach.
First, we take moral authority to be located in what is
normatively justifiable rather than social practice as such.
Hence, we would not consider individuals’ views that a
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particular practice was ethically acceptable to be definitive
proof of its ethical acceptability. Such individuals might be
wrong. At the same time, our approach is amenable to
making changes to normative judgements or broader
normative theory if, say, the empirical data showed certain
features of the examined context to have a normative
significance previously ignored.
Second, we recognise that qualitative research is not
necessarily a path to some general set of facts about
individuals’ responses to a given practice, potentially of-
fering only a contingent and partial account of aspects
of the participants’ lives [30]. Thus, rather than viewing
the empirical parts of this research as establishing some
fact of the matter about individuals’ views about the eth-
ical issues around diagnostic technologies, instead our
aim is to use such interactions to help us, as ethicists,
develop our own understanding of the ethical consider-
ations at play. The thought here, then, is that through
what Michael Parker has called ‘encounters with experi-
ence’ [31], one is able to develop a more fine-grained
appreciation of the ethical landscape than would be pos-
sible through abstract philosophical reflection alone.
The method followed in this paper comprises three
steps: i) an initial reflection on the potential ethical con-
siderations at play; ii) qualitative research, also designed to
elicit perspectives on the ethical problem at hand; and, iii)
a revision of the initial reflections in light of an interroga-
tion of the qualitative data. We now describe each of these
in greater detail.
Initial reflection
The first step comprised an initial reflection by two
researchers (BR and JW) on the main ethical issues that
might be raised by self-test diagnostic kits for influenza.
This involved, variously: i) an informal review of emerging
medical, sociological and ethical literature on both point-
of-care and self-test diagnostic technologies published
within in the last 20 years, ii) informal discussions with
the team designing the i-sense kits, and iii) independent
philosophical analysis of the technologies. Where neces-
sary, potential considerations identified in the literature,
during conversation, or following independent reflection
were subjected to additional research (say, by ‘reading
around’ the subject, discussing with colleagues, or apply-
ing further philosophical reasoning), before researchers
came to a final judgement as to their relevance. Each
source of information (literature, discussions, philosoph-
ical analysis) guided research into the other two and re-
searchers met regularly to discuss findings. Aiming at
inclusivity rather than exclusivity, all considerations taken
to be in any way pertinent to the moral acceptability of
self-testing kits for influenza were included. These consid-
erations are summarised below in the results section.
Qualitative research
The qualitative aspect of the research took the form of
three focus groups, convened to consider the ethical
issues raised by self-testing for influenza, concentrating
in particular on the tool being developed by i-sense.
Focus groups were chosen over other qualitative
research methods (e.g. in-depth interviews) for a few
reasons. First, focus groups have been widely used to
examine people’s experience of health and social care
topics [32–35] and their experience of technology and
health [36, 37]. Second, as an ethical enquiry, we were
keen to generate opportunities for point-counterpoint
discussion and among equals, illuminating the differ-
ence in perspectives, where our worry was that in a
one-to-one encounter they may have been more likely
to defer to the expertise of the researcher, or to feel in-
timidated by that expertise. Thirdly, the data generated
through social interaction of a group are often deeper
and richer than those obtained from one to one inter-
views [38]. Accordingly, focus groups seemed a suitable
approach given the relatively broad nature of the
enquiry, allowing the group to generate and explore
their ideas, in a way which would not be possible in an
interview, allowing participants to use their own
vocabulary, generate their own ideas and pursue their
own priorities, drawing out latent issues [32]. Finally,
given many participants were new to the technologies
being discussed, it was thought that mini-groups may
be preferable to one-to-one encounters as they allowed
individual respondents to time and space within the
research encounter to reflect on the technology being
presented and their ethical opinions – i.e. to think
while others were speaking..
In selecting participants for the focus groups, our ap-
proach was informed by Ives and Draper’s dictum that in
seeking to understand the context of a problem one needs
to sensitise oneself ‘to the needs and experiences of those
most affected by it’ [39]. As such, the make-up of the three
groups was designed first and foremost to reflect individ-
uals’ differing levels of knowledge and familiarity with the
technology in question, rather than with respect to any
particular demographic group. Further, based on Kruger,
focus groups work best when participants share similar
characteristics [40]. The three groups comprised:
i) members of the public – which is to say, those
entirely new to i-sense technologies but potential
future users;
ii) participants involved in the UK FluSurvey project2
[41] – those familiar with novel methods of
influenza detection, though not necessarily the
i-sense technologies;
iii) i-sense administrative staff and researchers – those
familiar and knowledgeable about i-sense technologies.
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Members of the public were recruited through email
advertising, using staff and student mailing lists at
University College London and a Healthwatch e-
newsletter,3 as well as through advertising on Twitter
and university-wide posters. FluSurvey participants
were recruited from an existing pool of FluSurvey
users who have previously voiced an interest in par-
ticipating in focus groups, known to one of the re-
searchers (CW). i-sense participants were approached
through an email advert to all PhD students and staff
working on the i-sense project (both from UCL and
other universities).
Recruitment took place from October to November
2015. Responses were received from 8 members of the
public, 8 FluSurvey users and 10 i-sense researchers. To
ensure the perspective offered by each group remained
distinctive, researchers checked members of the public
had not previously taken part in FluSurvey, or were part
of the i-sense project; with FluSurvey users that they had
not taken part in i-sense, and with i-sense researchers
that they had not taken part in FluSurvey. No such over-
laps were found and, due to relatively low numbers, all
respondents were recruited. Participants received a £10
gift voucher as an incentive to participate. The study re-
ceived ethical approval from UCL’s Research Ethics
Committee (7543/001).
During the focus groups, researchers presented all
participants with a prototype of the i-sense diagnostic
technology and explained how it worked (for logistical
reasons, it was not possible to do this prior to the group
meeting).4 Researchers then asked semi-structured,
open-ended questions about the possible benefits and
concerns of the technology, encouraging participants to
talk about their experiences and stimulating them to ex-
press their opinion. (A copy of the topic guide can be
found in Additional file 1). Where facilitators felt discus-
sions might benefit from a specific question, participants
were asked directly about some of the potential benefits
and concerns and related ethics that had been identified
during the initial review. However, since the purpose of
the qualitative stage of the research was to get a fresh
perspective on the ethics of technologies, rather than ne-
cessarily to ‘test’ the relevancy of the reasons generated
by the initial review (that work being done by the
researchers themselves, both during the initial review
and in the ‘analysis and synthesis’ stage of the research
detailed below), facilitators generally avoided leading the
discussions in this way wherever possible.
Toward the end of the session, researchers asked par-
ticipants whether any of their judgements about such
technologies would change if a) the technologies were
used to diagnose diseases other than influenza; or if b)
they were currently in the midst of a pandemic. These
questions were based on evidence showing that perception
of different diseases, and diseases during pandemic phases
can be important for the acceptability of different health
interventions [42, 43]. With respect to the latter, partici-
pants were asked to imagine themselves in the midst of
the 2009 H1N1 pandemic and were shown a video clip of
press coverage from the time to remind them of the
outbreak.
All three focus groups took place in December 2015.
As a result of non-attendance by some respondents, the
final groups comprised of 5 members of public, 7 Flu-
Survey users and 9 i-sense researchers. Each focus
group lasted approximately 90 min. Participants were
informed about the goal of the study and signed a con-
sent form indicating that they agreed to anonymous ex-
tracts being published and to the conversation being
audiotaped. Recordings were transcribed verbatim.
Analysis and synthesis
To safeguard against subjective perception [38], tran-
scripts of the focus groups were analysed independ-
ently by each researcher (BR, CW, JW). Researchers
undertook a classical context analysis of the qualita-
tive data [44, 45]. This involved a number of stages
[46]. Firstly the data were examined, then cate-
gorised into risks and benefits. As suggested by
Krueger & Casey (2000) ‘analysis begins by going
back to the intention of the study’ [47]. As such, the
second step was to extract those risks or benefits
which had been identified in the initial review.
Thirdly, the transcripts were analysed to identify
benefits or risks of the technologies which had not
been anticipated prior to the focus groups, which
were also extracted. Interpretation of data from each
focus group, including consideration of the context,
frequency, consistency, extensiveness and intensity of
discussion were assessed within the research group
until consensus was reached. Fourthly, the data were
then grouped thematically, based on the questions
asked by the researchers which resulted in similar
themed comments across the three groups, (see sec-
tions 3.1-3.5).
Once researchers had reached a settled view on the
data, a new analysis of the ethics of the relevant
technologies was undertaken. Part of this involved an
assessment of the extent to which participants’ observa-
tions expanded the expected range of ethical concerns.
In this, researchers followed a broadly ‘coherentist’
approach analogous to one outlined by Ives and Draper
[39]. The primary aim of this approach is to reach a
type of ‘reflective equilibrium’ [48], specifically one
wherein ‘the demands of empirical data and the de-
mands of theory are weighed up against one another’
[39], in order to reach normative conclusions – conclu-
sions that may be local or may have wider application.5
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We present the outcome of this process in the discus-
sion section.
Results
Initial review of potential costs and benefits of self-tests
for influenza
Following a review of the medical, sociological and
bioethical literature on diagnostic technologies, re-
searchers compiled the following list of potential ben-
efits and concerns around self-tests for influenza
(please Table 1 and Table 2 below).
We now present findings from the focus groups on the
ethics of self-tests for influenza.
Potential benefits of self-testing diagnostic technologies
for influenza
Upon being presented with the i-sense diagnostic for
influenza, participants suggested a range of potential
benefits. First, participants from all three focus groups
acknowledged that one of the benefits of such tests is
that they allowed users to gain first-hand, immediate
knowledge of their influenza status. One FluSurvey
user, for example, commented ‘It would be really nice
to know whether in fact I did have ‘flu or not or
whether it was just a man getting excited about a cold’
(F5). However, it was also clear that participants were
sceptical about the value of such knowledge in itself.
Rather, participants in all three groups argued that
such knowledge was only valuable insofar as it made a
difference to which treatment options one pursued, or
if it led directly to a specific health service interven-
tion. As one member of the public commented:
‘That is actually a good point because you need an
action immediately. Instead of just having the
diagnosis, like a big ‘yes’ on the screen, you’re
positive, it’s like, “Okay, now what?”’ (M2)
Another benefit mentioned both by members of the
public and FluSurvey users was that the test could help
one avoid unnecessary clinical consultations. Notably,
for respondents in both groups this was as much about
ensuring that they did not ‘waste’ their doctor’s time, or
‘bother’ them, as it was wasting their own time in con-
sulting a physician unnecessarily.
These more altruistic considerations were also present
in respondents’ views about the potential public health
benefit of the kits – one feature of the diagnostic tool
being developed by i-sense being that it allowed for a
‘real-time’ geographical tracking of influenza ‘hotspots’
as they developed, enabling health service interventions
to be directed accordingly. One FluSurvey user noted,
for example, that ‘Maybe if you begin to notice there are
some outbreaks of flu that it is worth spending the
money to campaign to get people who are at risk to
make sure they get to the pharmacy or the GP to have a
flu jab’ (F1),6 others emphasising that this would be par-
ticularly beneficial for ‘at risk’ communities. Similarly, one
i-sense researcher felt this benefit was significant enough
to overcome their normal aversion to sharing data in other
contexts:
Table 1 Potential benefits of self-test diagnostic technologies for influenza
Benefit Description
Knowledge of one’s health status Self-test devices enable users to ascertain their health status [17].
Individual health benefit Diagnostic devises could allow for more effective self-management of health and medical
intervention, reducing the risk of disease, slowing or preventing disease development
and/or making treatment more effective [17].
Autonomy Diagnostic devices as a means of allowing persons to take control of the management
of their own health [17].
Privacy and anonymity Self-testing allows for individuals to conduct diagnostic tests anonymously and in private
[14, 19].
Improving the doctor-patient relationship By enabling individuals to take greater control of their health, rather than, say, being
dependent on medical practitioners for knowledge of their current health status,
self-testing will allow for a better doctor-patient relationship, one wherein both parties
are actively involved in decision-making. [20].
Health benefit to others Assuming individuals change their behaviour once they receive a positive result, rapid
diagnosis could help users from unintentionally passing on infection [14].
Improving health awareness By giving individuals the ability to monitor their own health status, self-testing may lead
to a greater awareness of one’s health and of efforts at health promotion. [58].
Facilitation of public health interventions By enabling more tests to be conducted and test data to be shared with health systems
more easily, some diagnostic tests may enable researchers to identify disease ‘hot spots’
and direct public health interventions accordingly.
Social benefit Laboratory-independence means tests can often be conducted in diverse settings, most
notably those with poor health service or laboratory infrastructure.
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‘I mean there are other apps that I always am just like
no, there's no benefit to [sharing my data] but I can
actually appreciate public health benefit.’ (R3)
At the same time, however, it was noticeable that of
the three groups, only FluSurvey users noted a more
basic benefit of the diagnostic technologies: namely, that
they could benefit others by preventing users from unin-
tentionally passing on their infection (see ‘health benefit
to others’ consideration in Table 1). The FluSurvey users
also noted that, by virtue of the fact they did not require
samples to be analysed in lab, such tests were also of
particular benefit in countries with poor health services
or laboratory infrastructure (‘social benefit’ consideration
in Table 1).
‘I know we are talking about it in flu terms but
certainly the potential as a diagnostic tool worldwide
in somewhere that people who can’t necessarily get to
a GP easily or get to a medical resource easily.’ (F2)
None of the participants made any unprompted men-
tion of issues around autonomy, improving the doctor-
patient relationship, improving health awareness or the
ability to conduct tests in private (neither were they
prompted to discuss these issues). However, participants
did raise several new benefits researchers previously
overlooked. Participants in the FluSurvey group, for ex-
ample, noticed that the diagnostic technology could help
to reassure the ‘worried well’ through a quick ‘all clear’
diagnosis and moreover, such kits might also aid in
‘automation’ of employee medical certificates. i-sense re-
searchers also noted that such diagnostics might prevent
the misuse of antibiotics for viral infections. However, it
is also worth mentioning that in recognising this benefit,
the i-sense researchers also voiced a concern that it
might be ‘negative’ for developers to say that one benefit
of the technologies is that they prevent people from tak-
ing certain treatments when ill (however inappropriate
those treatments might be). In turn, this led to a discus-
sion about how developers might build and maintain
public trust in self-test kits. Are there some benefits to
such technologies that it is better (more prudent) for the
developers not to mention?
Potential concerns of self-testing diagnostic technologies
for influenza
As well as these potential benefits of diagnostic tech-
nologies for influenza, the focus group participants also
expressed a number of possible concerns. One issue for
all three groups was the accuracy of the test itself. As
well as being concerned about the accuracy of the
technology in general, i-sense researchers in particular
were concerned that, when used as a self-test, there was
Table 2 Potential concerns with self-test diagnostic technologies for influenza
Concern Description
Inaccurate diagnoses Inaccurate diagnostic kits may lead to individuals undertaking harmful behaviours, either
as the result of a false positive or a false negative [15, 16].
Inaccurate understanding Individuals may misunderstand test results or accuracy of those results [17, 18].
Insufficient pre-test support structures By enabling individuals to diagnose themselves away from health care settings, self-testing
kits may mean individuals undertake test without the pre-test counselling by health care
professionals and/or counselling services, potentially leading to psychological harm
[14, 19, 20].
Insufficient post-test support structures By enabling individuals to diagnose themselves away from clinical settings, self-testing kits
may mean individuals receive test results without the support of health care professionals
and/or counselling services [20, 26].
Deter necessary service interactions By enabling self-diagnosis, self-tests may lead to individuals consulting clinicians about their
health less frequently, meaning conditions other than those being tested for are left
undiagnosed for longer.
Undermining obligations to others By performing tests in private, individuals may be less likely to inform others of diagnosis
(e.g. contact tracing) [26].
Undermining relationship to others By supporting an overly individualistic model of health care, self-testing may be inappropriate
for health care, which tends to privilege close relationships and human interdependence [17].
Threat of testing becoming mandatory Danger of self-testing being made obligatory, either legally or through social pressure
(e.g. during an epidemic) thereby infringing individuals’ right ‘not to know’ [14, 59].
Privacy breaches through theft of kit Individuals’ right to privacy may be infringed through theft and/or misuse of the diagnostic
kit [26].
Privacy breaches through use of test data Where test data is stored and analysed remotely, individuals’ right to privacy may be infringed
through misuse of data (including onward sale to third parties).
Cost and unequal access If the cost of the diagnostic technology is sufficiently high, distribution based on ability to pay
may exacerbate existing health inequalities [14, 20].
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an added risk of individuals not using the technology
properly, thereby further jeopardizing the validity of the
results.
‘As a scientist, I would also consider the accuracy of
that test in a home setting because, as you mentioned,
some people might not go deep enough [with the
swab]. If I see a negative, is it really negative and then
I don't do anything.’ (R7)
From this, the i-sense group suggested that the tech-
nology should come with a ‘control’, informing the user
that the test had been used appropriately (such as with a
pregnancy test). In a related discussion, one FluSurvey
user suggested that the technology should only ever offer
provisional guidance, with a strong recommendation to
seek further medical advice:
‘I think the message always has to be whatever the
result if you are concerned to talk to your health
professional…I think it should never be presented as
something which is giving you a cast iron, copper
bottom medical advice. It is only a tool that provides
guidance for what you might do.’ (F1)
All groups raised the question of how much the tech-
nology would cost and/or whether it would be provided
free, for example by the National Health Service (NHS).
In most cases, this was about whether the technology
constituted good value for money for them personally.
However, one FluSurvey user also wondered whether
free provision of fast diagnostic technologies might also
be beneficial to the health provider itself as a matter of
technical efficiency:
‘If they aren’t that cheap then if it was in some way
tied in or they have an effect such that they do reduce
the strain on the NHS then surely the NHS to give
them out as a freebie to certain groups.’(F3)
Along with these concerns, one issue that received
extensive discussion in all three groups was the risk of
privacy breaches through use of test data. In the pre-
amble to the discussion, facilitators explained that users
of the diagnostic technologies could choose to share
data about their result, themselves and their geograph-
ical location with public health researchers and the
public health service but that one risk associated with
this is that it might threaten individuals’ privacy. Each
group responded to this concern differently. Members
of the public were relatively relaxed about these risks,
arguing ‘for most people they would not care about that
much’ (M1) and ‘as long as you keep the name confi-
dential, all the other data can be shared’ (M5). With
one exception, both FluSurvey users and i-sense
researchers were similarly sanguine about sharing their
data with the i-sense group and potentially a public
health service more widely for research purposes. How-
ever, both groups reacted strongly against the possibil-
ity of the data being sold to commercial companies,
either as a commodity in itself or for marketing pur-
poses. One FluSurvey user argued:
‘From a personal perspective I think the risk of our
personal medical data being sold for commercial
purposes you want to talk about risk with something
that I am really not comfortable with, I do find that
very difficult.’ (F1)
Two further features of this discussion are worth
noting. First, far from seeing the sharing of test data
with the public health service as a potential threat to
privacy, several participants argued that the data ought
to be automatically linked with their NHS record, so
their physician could be kept abreast of their current in-
fluenza status. Second, it was clear that, in the case of
some participants, it was not necessarily that they were
undaunted about the potential threat to their privacy
posed by the i-sense tool as they were resigned to the
fact that, at any given moment, their informational priv-
acy was being infringed by various actors and, in that
sense, these tests were no different and perhaps better
(being for a more worthwhile cause).
None of the participants made any mention of the
other issues identified in Table 2, such as the technology
undermining of relationship to others, becoming com-
pulsory (either as a matter of legislation or social pres-
sure), or deterring necessary clinical consultations, nor
did they make any mention of the risk that one’s privacy
might be infringed through theft of kit, the possibility of
inaccurate understanding of the test results or the ab-
sence of pre- and post- diagnosis counselling, when the
kit was used at home.
At the same time, participants from the i-sense group
did raise two new concerns around such technologies:
first that it might facilitate hypochondria (‘I also think
there's a concern, the worried well, people who are not
really ill just continually testing, getting increasingly
obsessed’ – R4); second that it might change social inter-
actions, in that it may become the norm for individuals
to demand another’s health status prior to close contact.
Both these considerations appeared to be part of more
general concern that in enabling individuals to have
quick and easy access to information about their health,
self-testing may lead to an ‘unhealthy’ approach to one’s
current health status – that it could come to dominate
one’s understanding of oneself and others where it
should remain in the background. In this way, then,
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participants identified a possible cost to the technology’s
ability to grant true information about one’s health
status previously overlooked during the initial review
(which had tended to assume that all such knowledge
was to the good, the problem being instances in which
the diagnostic technology presented false information or
when a user misunderstood the information being pre-
sented to them).
Using self-tests to diagnose other diseases and conditions
One of the issues researchers were interested in examin-
ing was the extent to which participants’ views about the
ethics of self-testing depended on the type of disease
being investigated. To investigate this issue, facilitators
asked each focus group to consider whether they would
change any of their prior responses if the diagnostic tool
were for testing diseases other than influenza (examples
given included chicken pox, Ebola and HIV/AIDS).
This set of questions prompted a range of responses.
First, both members of the public and FluSurvey users
argued that one’s moral obligation to prevent passing on
infection to others was far stronger with regards to
diseases with a high case fatality rate than they were for
influenza, in turn, making the technology’s ‘health bene-
fit to others’ a more weighty consideration in its favour.
FluSurvey users also judged the fact that self-testing
could be employed in countries with poor health care in-
frastructure (‘social benefit’ consideration in Table 1) to
be of greater importance when it was suggested that
such tools could be used to diagnose diseases with a
greater potential transmission rate or symptom severity
than influenza.
Notably, it was also only when it was suggested that
similar kits could be used for sexually transmitted dis-
eases such as chlamydia and HIV /AIDS that partici-
pants remarked that one benefit of the technology was
that it allowed individuals to perform the test in private
(‘privacy and anonymity’ consideration in Table 1),
something that they had not mentioned with respect to
self-testing for influenza. As one FluSurvey user put it:
‘I was thinking along the lines of sexual health,
not necessarily HIV but more the chlamydia and
gonorrhoea. That might be something that people
would prefer to in-house test at home before go-
ing to the GP rather than going straight down
there.’ (F3)
Changing the disease the diagnostic tested for also
changed participants’ views about their associated prob-
lems. For example, when asked to imagine that the i-
sense tool diagnosed HIV/AIDS, rather than influenza,
participants from all three groups were much more con-
cerned about sharing their data with researchers and the
attendant risks to their privacy. As one member of the
public explained:
‘I think it depends on things that you are worried
about. If you have worry about that you are being
infected by HIV, then you definitely would not like
others to share…your information….[S] omething like
a small infection…that’s fine. It depends on different
kinds of diseases.’ (M1)
Moreover, it was also only when researchers suggested
that the diagnostic technology could be used to diagnose
potentially life-threatening diseases like HIV/AIDS that
participants began to voice concerns about the lack of
pre- and post-diagnosis counselling. As a FluSurvey user
put it:
‘I think you would feel very isolated if you got a yes.
I think you need more counselling, more background,
more help or more something before you take the
test. Once you have that and then you get a yes or a
no then you can deal with the answer I think.’ (F6)
Using self-tests during a pandemic
As well as seeking to find out the extent to which
participants’ views depended upon the disease being
diagnosed, researchers also sought to understand how
(if at all) participants’ views about the technology changed
in conditions of a pandemic. Faced with this scenario,
participants’ intuitions about the benefits and risks of self-
testing changed in several ways. First, for one FluSurvey
user, the context of a pandemic gave greater significance
to the diagnostic information generated by the technology
(‘Knowledge of one’s health status’ consideration in
Table 1). Participants from all groups also valued the
benefits of the technology in limiting the spread of infec-
tion much more highly in the case of a pandemic (‘Health
benefit to others’ consideration in Table 1). As one mem-
ber of the public explained:
‘I would do it just to check on me but also to protect
the others, because if I have it, then obviously – and it’s
not a common cold – then I wouldn’t walk in school…
or go to the airport, or do anything of the sort, because
I would jeopardise the health of the other people. If I’d
do it, I’d do it so that I would stay at home.’ (M4)
Following this altruistic line of thought – with partici-
pants again considering how the diagnostic tool might
be beneficial for people other than themselves (that is,
while imagining themselves as the user) – participants
also emphasised the fact that such tests might alleviate
pressure on the NHS or health provider by allowing for
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diagnosis at home (‘Deter unnecessary service interac-
tions’ consideration in Table 1).
In the context of a pandemic, participants from all
three groups were also much more open to sharing data
about their test results and themselves with public
health researchers and the health service in order to help
track the spread of the infection; that there was, as one
i-sense researcher put it, ‘a sense of solidarity’.
Overall, the response from the group was that in the
case of a pandemic, the benefits of such technology
became even more valuable and its potential problems
were taken to be less concerning. Perhaps the only prob-
lem that participants did feel would be exacerbated in
pandemic conditions was the potential for the technology
to become mandatory or rather, for there to be greater so-
cial pressure to use it.
Discussion
Data gathered during the focus groups simultaneously
demands several adjustments to our understanding of
the ethics of self-test diagnostic technologies and yields
a number of lessons for developers of such technologies.
It also brings into focus certain limitations both of this
study and, potentially, empirical ethics methodologies in
general. In this section, we discuss each of these in turn.
Changes to our understanding of the ethics of self-test
diagnostics demanded by the empirical evidence
Perhaps the most valuable thing to emerge from the
focus groups was the addition of five new consider-
ations around the ethics of diagnostic technologies
overlooked in our initial review. In drawing our atten-
tion to these issues, one can see the value of seeking
responses on a given technology from a diverse range
of participants and, in particular, participants who ap-
proach the technology from a diverse range of perspec-
tives. Although these issues might have been raised by
participants from any group, the fact that, for example,
the diagnostic tool might prevent the misuse of antibiotics
for viral infection was raised by the i-sense researchers
seems to point to the value of obtaining views from
groups with differing expertise (a reasonable assumption
being that the i-sense researchers would normally be
better versed in treatment options for influenza and the
dangers posed by overuse of antibiotics than a reasonably
random selection group of members of the public or
FluSurvey users).
One notable feature of the new considerations them-
selves, perhaps, is that while they all clearly contribute
to the ethical acceptability of the technologies being
developed by i-sense, none of them seem sufficient to
establish the ethical acceptability of such technologies
overall. The fact, then, that such technologies might
reassure the worried well, does not seem to establish
that they are all-things-considered a ‘good thing’; nor the
fact that they might alter social interactions for the
worse that they are therefore ethically impermissible.
This reflects a wider pattern in the group discussion:
namely, that none of the participants took any of the
considerations for or against the use of the relevant
technologies to be decisive in establishing their ethical
acceptability. Rather, all such reasons were considered
contributory reasons, features whose presence counts to-
wards the overall goodness or badness of some objection
or action [49], but which could be traded-off against one
another in an overall assessment of the technology’s
value. Again, this seems correct.
Another way in which data from the group discussion
aids ethical inquiry is insofar as it draws attention to cer-
tain issues arising from considerations already flagged in
the initial review but which themselves may have previ-
ously gone unnoticed. For example, although some par-
ticipants were perhaps over-zealous in their view that
knowledge about one’s health status could only be con-
sidered beneficial insofar as it made a difference to one’s
future course of action (we can recognise that there
might still be an intrinsic value to such knowledge), by
making that point they drew attention to the fact that
some individuals will only take up such tests where they
can see a clear reason to participate. Group discussions
were also useful in reminding us that interactions with the
health provider come with two sets of opportunity costs:
one to the patient and one to the attending physician.
One thing that came through strongly in all three
focus groups was just how disease specific participants’
thinking about many of these considerations was, both
in the risks and benefits that they picked out as salient
and in the weight they accorded to them. Some of these
patterns look eminently predictable. We would expect,
for example, that the health benefits of diagnostic tests –
and, conversely, the need for pre- and post-diagnosis
counselling – increase the more severe the symptoms of
the disease, or the greater potential transmission rate.
However, it also looks like that there is a level of granu-
larity to the ethical acceptability of different technologies
that may have been previously neglected. Indeed, in re-
spect to certain considerations, it may be that the ethical
desirability of a given diagnostic depends not only on
what disease is being tested for but where that test is
taking place. Whether a disease carries a social stigma,
for example, is likely to vary from society to society, as
are perceptions about privacy and concerns over data
protection. Data gathered on self-testing in pandemic
conditions also reminds us that the patterns of consider-
ations at play can be a matter of ‘when’ the tool is being
employed, as much as ‘where’ and ‘about what’.
Findings from the focus groups were also useful in
pointing to new opportunities. As reported above, several
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participants argued that the data from the kit ought to be
linked automatically with their NHS record, so their gen-
eral practitioner could be kept abreast of their current
health state. This willingness and indeed expectation that
data will flow for the purposes of direct care where appro-
priate is consistent with broader information governance
legislation and policy within the NHS, such as the 2013
Information Governance Review, which concluded that
the duty to share information ‘can be as important as
the duty to protect patient confidentiality’ [50] and the
Health and Social Care (Safety and Quality) Act 2015.
The ability for patients to not only see, but also make
additions to, their Personal Health Record are sched-
uled to be available for all NHS patients by 2018, so
there is an obvious opportunity to allow self-test data
to connect up in this way.7
As a final point, it ought to be mentioned that none of
the data suggests to us that any of the initial set of
benefits and risks detailed in Tables 1 and 2 were either
mischaracterised, mislabelled (e.g. as benefits rather than
concerns) or irrelevant. Similarly, the fact that partici-
pants chose to focus on some considerations rather than
others – say, the fact that the test could help one avoid
unnecessary clinical consultations over its health benefits
in limiting the spread of infection – does not suggest
that, as such, we ought to take these as the most pressing
issues in considering the various merits and shortcomings
of the kits.
Recommendations for the development of self-test
diagnostic technologies for influenza
In furthering our knowledge about the moral consider-
ations at play in evaluating self-test diagnostic technolo-
gies, the findings of this research project generate a
number of lessons for the future development of app-
based influenza diagnostics. The process of coming to a
reflective equilibrium about this particular diagnostic
tool formed part of a commitment to responsible re-
search and innovation on behalf of the project funding
it, and thus we drew on an emerging literature connect-
ing empirical ethics to the responsible research and
innovation agenda [51].
Given this focus, the object of our reflective equilib-
rium was not only the ethical issues raised by influenza
diagnostic tools in general, but also the types of ethical
and governance challenges that could result from
bringing this particular diagnostic tool to market, and
how the design of the prototype might be iterated in re-
sponse to these. One important decision point in the
development of this, and any diagnostic tool, is whether
the tool would count as a registered medical device,
and if so, of what class. If a tool does count as a med-
ical device, it needs to be registered and the test and
validation data needs to be available for scrutiny by the
regulator. Directive (93/42/EEC) and Directive (98/79/
EC), set out the framework within the EU.8 The rise of
fitness trackers and health apps more generally has
created a degree of uncertainty around what counts as
a medical device, with a new EU-wide Regulation ex-
pected to be adopted soon.9
There were more than 165,000 health apps on the
market in 2017, of which only a very small percentage
were registered as medical devices. Most of these provide
general advice and education, or allow self-tracking, but as
the New York Attorney General examined in an investiga-
tion that led to three app manufacturers being fined, some
claim to “measure vital signs and other key health indica-
tors using only a smartphone” without having adequately
tested and validated the accuracy of the results [52].
Moreover, earlier work showed that even apps that had
undergone a process of appraisal to enter the curated
NHS Health Apps Library raised very serious concerns of
privacy and data protection [53].
Much of the approach to testing and validation that is
required for medical devices for self-testing will also be
good practice for diagnostic tool kits that are not med-
ical devices, for instance that they ‘must be designed and
manufactured in such a way that they perform appropri-
ately for their intended purpose taking into account the
skills and the means available to users and the influence
resulting from variation that can reasonably be antici-
pated in users’ technique and environment’ [54].
We recommend the following, some of which depend
on whether or not the tool is to be a medical device:
First, to minimize the risk of individuals
misunderstanding test results, all results should come
with a warning as to their accuracy. Given it has been
shown people often find it difficult to understand risks
when rendered in percentages [55], these ought to be
presented in natural frequencies. (For example, ‘For
two in every 100 people, this result will be wrong’; as
opposed to ‘This test is 98% accurate’). It may also be
prudent for such information to differentiate between
the sensitivity and specificity, which is to say, between
(a) how likely is it that given a positive result you
actually have flu, and (b) how likely is it that given a
negative result, you do not have the flu. At the design
stage, empirical work should be undertaken to determine
the tolerance for false positives and false negatives within
the target population for each disease to be tested. Given
the contextual nature of individuals’ responses in our
focus groups, these tolerances are likely to be context
and disease specific.
Second, in order to ensure tests are of maximum utility,
designers should consider ways in which the app might
alert users to recommended courses of action, rather
than simply presenting users with a diagnostic result.
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For example, the app could give users information about
how they might avoid infecting others and remind them
of their moral obligations in this regard. However, it is
important to be clear about the nature of any advice
given, and whether such advice provision would require
the tool to be a registered medical device.
Third, where it is technically feasible for data to flow
securely, patients should be given the option for the
data from the self-test to be added to their personal
health record. Any choice to share the information
to the individual’s personal health record should be
entirely separate from consent to share the information
more widely.
Fourth, while running the app, users should be
encouraged to share their data for the purposes of
epidemiological research and disease surveillance.
Strict protocols should also be put in place to ensure
that consent for diagnosis and direct care is kept
separate from consent for research and disease
surveillance. Users should be able to withhold their
consent to sharing their data at any stage in the process
(and be given some choices about what information to
share), even if this results in a less useful data set.
Consent for the use of such data for research purposes
should not be mistaken for consent for such data to be
sold to private companies, either as a commodity or for
marketing purposes.
Fifth, to guard against misconceptions about the
technology and to build public trust, designers need
to be clear and transparent about how the technology
works, who the data is held by, whom any shared data
is shared with and what purposes such data is put to.
Following participants’ discussion about whether there
are some benefits it is better for developers not to
advertise (Section 3.2), we believe developers should
also be open and transparent about all the potential
benefits and drawbacks of such technologies, even
when that challenges deep-seated behaviours among
the public. If, then, a diagnostic kit for influenza might
help to slow the rise of antibiotic resistance by dissuading
individuals from taking antibiotics unnecessarily,
developers should highlight that fact. .
Limitations of the study
We take the findings presented above to showcase one
example in which qualitative research methods can be
used to supplement and augment traditional philosoph-
ical reflection. At the same time, however, the study has
certain limitations.
First, although recruiting participants from i-sense staff
and students allowed researchers to gather data from
those with intimate knowledge of the relevant technolo-
gies, it also incurred certain costs. Three of the nine i-
sense participants were known to the facilitators and all
could be said to have at least some form of professional
relationship with one another, simply by virtue of belong-
ing to the same research group. Despite facilitators efforts
to encourage participants to ‘speak freely’ in all focus
groups, these facts may have had some bearing on the
opinions offered (for example, it may be that staff felt they
could not be as critical of the technology as they would,
say, in a private conversation).
The quality of the discussion within each of the focus
groups was also not always as high as it might have
been. On the one hand, as detailed at length above, all
three focus groups generated extremely useful informa-
tion, giving voice to a number of benefits and concerns
which had not been picked up in the initial review, as
well as providing other data that has been vital in
designing recommendations about how we ought to
govern self-test diagnostics in the future. In this sense,
the value of the qualitative aspects of the research – and
the project of a more ‘empirical’ ethics more widely – is
entirely vindicated. However, at the same time, partici-
pants often failed to engage a rigorous ethical assess-
ment of the technologies at hand. For example, at times,
participants offered views about the benefits and risks of
the diagnostic that depended on false or questionable or
assumptions about treatment options (such as that it
would be useful because, once one received a positive re-
sult, one would be able to seek an antibiotic prescrip-
tion, or a flu jab). At other times, respondents appeared
to engage in fallacious reasoning. For example, at one
point participants argued that even if those handling
data generated by the diagnostic kit violated their right
to privacy – say, by sharing it with third-parties without
their consent – such violations were not of any norma-
tive significance because their right to privacy was
already being regularly violated by numerous other par-
ties; whereas the mere fact that one’s right to privacy is
already being violated by others would not make it any
less ethically unacceptable for i-sense, or any other
designer of diagnostic technologies, to violate one’s right
to privacy.10
To a certain extent, this might be seen as an inevitable
consequence of a flaw in the study’s design. As set out in
the Methods section, during the focus groups, facilita-
tors deliberately refrained from intervening in the partic-
ipants’ discussion wherever possible. This was for a
couple of reasons: first, as intimated above, since we
were keen to get a fresh perspective on the ethics of
technologies, facilitators were reluctant to ask any lead-
ing questions. More broadly, however, facilitators also
wanted to cultivate an atmosphere in which participants
felt they could speak freely; the thought being to encour-
age all ideas as ‘good ideas’ in the first instance and then
weed out the good from the bad when the data was ana-
lysed (as we have done).
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Of course, it might be argued that the research encoun-
ter would have been more productive, and produced a
richer, more rigorous discussion of the issues at hand, if
facilitators had adopted a more Socratic approach to the
focus groups, perhaps challenging participants on the
merits of their ideas, or pointing out when they were en-
gaging in fallacious reasoning. Such an approach has a
rich pedigree in empirical ethics, having been pioneered
by Alderson, Farsides and Williams in the early 2000s
[56], and endorsed more recently by Dunn, Sheehan,
Hope and Parker [57]. However, in this particular case, we
maintain that such an approach would have been more
likely to close down discussions rather than open them
up. It ought to be remembered that participants from two
out of the three focus groups in our project had no prior
knowledge of the relevant topic whatsoever (the technol-
ogy being a prototype); were not acknowledged experts in
the field (who, as such, might feel confident about offering
their opinion even among strangers); were completely un-
known to each other prior to the meeting - and thus were
in the process of establishing their social status within the
group during the discussion itself; and, perhaps most im-
portantly, were considering several of the questions before
them for the very first time. All this, in our view, made it
highly unlikely that participants would respond well to
having whatever nascent opinions they offered publicly
challenged in an unusual social scenario by what would
have been, for them, the only ‘experts’ in the room.
Overall, we believe these findings point to a deep di-
lemma for the project of empirical ethics. As Ives and
Draper argue, we want to sensitize our ethics to the
needs and experiences of the individuals most affected
by the kinds of matters we are investigating. Yet here we
face a problem. On the one hand, those who are most
affected by such issues are not always those who are best
trained in articulating their ethical import. On the other
hand, those who are best trained in articulating the eth-
ical issues at stake – which is to say, ethicists – are
rarely those who are most affected. What we require,
then, is a way of constructing a research encounter in
such a way that it either enables ‘those who are most af-
fected’ to engage in a rigorous assessment of the ethical
issues, or enables ‘those who are best trained’ to gain a
deeper knowledge of what it is like to be affected by the
relevant question.
Conclusion
There seems good reason to think that diagnosis through
a self-test kit, such as that being developed by i-sense for
influenza, may 1-day become the norm for a range of
diseases and conditions. Yet the ethical issues around
such technologies remains unclear. In this article we
have sought to provide a near-comprehensive map of
the ethical issues around one set of technologies in
particular: namely, third-generation, self-testing kits for
influenza. In so doing, we have adopted a relatively new
method in bioethics, combining traditional philosophical
analysis with findings from qualitative research. Such
sociological research has been invaluable in identifying
new considerations at play in our ethical thinking about
diagnostic technologies, confirming and augmenting our
understanding of issues already identified, and stimulating
further ethical reflection. However, our study has also re-
vealed, perhaps, certain difficulties inherent in the empir-
ical ethics project – at least as it applies to the use of
focus groups. Such limitations do not undermine our find-
ings but they do show the difficulties involved in con-
structing research encounters that are able to both elicit
the views and experiences of those engaged in ethical di-
lemmas, while simultaneously satisfying the standards of a
philosophical discussion.
Endnotes
1Further information on the diagnostic tool and updates
on i-sense’s progress are available at http://www.i-sense.
org.uk.
2FluSurvey is an online service that any member of the
UK public can log onto to report flu like symptoms they
may experience during the winter months. The data is
used by researchers at Public Health England and
London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine to
monitor flu trends in the UK. For more information see
http://www.flusurvey.org.uk.
3Healthwatch England is the national consumer
champion in health and care, with statutory powers to
ensure the voice of the consumer is strengthened and
heard by those who commission, deliver and regulate
health and care services. For more information see
http://www.healthwatch.co.uk.
4To keep baseline conditions the same across all three
focus groups, facilitators also gave the same demonstra-
tion to participants from the i-sense group, although by
virtue of their backgrounds, most of them were already
familiar with the diagnostic kit and its workings.
5Dunn et al. have raised concerns about combining an
empirical ethics with a ‘coherentist’ approach to moral
philosophy (Dunn M, Sheehan M, Hope T, Parker M.
Toward methodological innovation in empirical ethics re-
search. Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics. 2012;
21(4): 466–80); one concern being it fails to recognise the
qualitative research as a journey towards particularity ra-
ther than universality (Carter SM. Beware dichotomies
and grand abstractions: Attending to particularity and
practice in empirical bioethics. American Journal of
Bioethics 2009;9:76–7). However, to respond briefly, it is
important to differentiate here between coherentist ap-
proaches to the analysis of empirical data and coherentist
approaches to the wider metaethical significance of such
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data. In adopting a method of reflective equilibrium, the
thought is not that any such data will allow us to under-
stand the way in which principles and intuitions coalesce
in general. Instead, it is that such a method allows us a
way of reaching a perspective on the normative meaning
of that datum. Thus, while we can agree with Dunn et al.
that such data is unlikely to ‘set us on a path to coherence’
with regards to how principles and intuitions coalesce in
general, that does not mean a method of reflective equilib-
rium in evaluating the normative meaning of the data in
question.
6It would probably be too late for a flu jab at this stage
which need to be done in advance of contracting the
strain. We discuss the implications of participants’ false
beliefs below in Section 4.3.
7While it is easy to see the potential benefits of this
kind of link, it also raises a number of questions about
how it might alter the doctor-patient relationship that
are ripe for further exploration: the relationship might
change from one in which the patient seeks medical
advice in discrete consultations (much as one might go
to a mechanic upon finding a fault with one’s car); to a
relationship of perpetual surveillance, in which the
doctor (or health service) is kept informed one’s health
status in real-time.
8This framework is broadly similar to that in the US,
but it should not be presupposed that if something is a
medical device in one regulatory framework it would
count as a medical device in another.
9Perhaps one might argue that, as far as violations go,
the potential violation incurred through misuse of one’s
diagnostic data would be a relatively minor one but this
did not seem to be the participants’ thought. Rather,
their thought seemed to be that since such violations
had become the norm they therefore no longer pre-
sented an ethical wrong.
10For progress reports, see: European Commission Web-
site. Revisions of Medical Device Directives. Available at:
http://ec.europa.eu/growth/sectors/medical-devices/regula-
tory-framework/revision_en. (Accessed 30 March 2017)
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